Saturday, June 24, 2006

Diplomatic Melioration vs. Diplomatic Transformation: A Case for Deterrence Pessimism in regards to the Subcontinent

Introduction: Setting Benchmarks

One view of nuclear deterrence rests as such: two rivals armed with nuclear weapons will not fight one another. Such an outcome may be beneficial to the all players in the world system. Instead of costly conventional war, countries will maintain security and have to accommodate one another.

Yet, the aforementioned view is incomplete. In assessing the relations between the USSR and America, China and the USSR, and now India and Pakistan, a clear corrective has been added to the theory of ‘nuclear stability’: countries will accommodate only after an initial period of crisis-adjustment.

To reach a conclusion on whether India has passed this transitional state, the paper will present three arguments that support deterrence optimism on the subcontinent, followed by three related counter-arguments. The first argument will present two viewpoints on developments within Kashmir, the most important conflict between the two nations. Next, the paper will present two viewpoints on recent comprehensive threat reduction measures and other ‘trust’ building exercises currently underway in the subcontinent. Finally, the paper will gauge the lessons of the most nuclear flashpoint: the 1999 Kargil crisis.

This paper will argue, while India and Pakistan are now doubt in a process of diplomatic melioration, the case for deterrence pessimism. India and Pakistan’s relations require a transformation of viewpoints and security needs that has yet to occur, and most likely retard in the future.

Kashmir: Defining Progress

A clear difference the Cold War and the current nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan is 1) their neighboring locations and 2) the existence of a clear boarder conflict. A key piece of nuclear-derived stability must have with it improvement in Kashmir.

I. Optimism

It is clear that the Kashmir dilemma moving in a positive direction. While there have been a recent massacre of Indians within Jammu & Kashmir, the peace process has not been deterred as of yet. Furthermore, this year’s release of the first Kashmiri film in nearly four decade shows that there has been at least an apparent thawing of the Kashmiri situation.[1]

What has changed recently in the position of Pakistan and India?

Pakistan has dropped the ‘non-starter’ demand for a plebiscite within the disputed region. Furthermore, Musharraf has pledged to halt terrorist incursions of the Line of Control (LOC) and, in the words of Musharraf, “Pakistan has taken the considered decision to be a part of the coalition, to be with the United States, to fight terrorism in all its forms wherever it exists.” Additionally, Musharraf has made sweeping calls for the demilitarization of the LOC—calls that have as of yet not been reinforced by India. But Pakistan foreign does seem to have a clear objective: moving away from maximalist goals in regards to Jammu & Kashmir.

India, as well, has moved back from maximalist demands. As Manju Parikh points out, India has not only removed troops but has engaged in talks with Kashmiri separatist groups in the All Party Hurriyat Conference.[2] These talks have recently led to the Indian Government and All Party Hurriyat Conference to agreeing to a “mechanism” for future talks.[3]

Regardless of the source of these changes (developing middle-class demands, desire to be seen as a responsible power, or the fatigue of the decades of conflict) these are all positive developments for Kashmir.

II. Pessimism

Yet, none of these developments have led to substantial agreements or force reduction along the Line of Control. The most that can be said of all discussions is that they are paving the road to real progress. Yet, is this progress meaningful?

India has refused Musharraf’s call for direct talks between the two countries to solve the Kashmir issue. Instead the Congress party has developed a working relationship with the All Party Hurriyat Conference—an Indian selected group of Kashmiri separatist leaders. Any agreements that come out of these talks will not reflect the viewpoints of all Kashmiri separatist groups and perhaps not Pakistan. Can progress really be made without an all inclusive discussion?

Here we see the main theme of this paper: diplomatic melioration between the two countries has not resulted in a diplomatic transformation. Pakistan still views the Kashmir issue as the first and paramount conflict with India. India does not share this viewpoint; instead pushing for resolution on other issues, and seeking peace in Kashmir through India-Kashmir talks. While a diplomatic transformation may be in the future, there are no clear signs this is the case (and not just dragging on the part of both parties). This leave open the possibility that Kashmir will gain be a nuclear flash-point.

Yet, on the most fundamental question—is there a current legitimacy and sanctity professed by both Pakistan and India of the Kashmiri territorial status-quo?—the answer is yes, however tenuous.

CTR and Trust: Progress but still a Long and Perilous Road Ahead

In addition to the Kashmir issue, numerous scholars have pointed to Comprehensive Threat Reduction Measures and Trust Building Measures (which tie into dialogue with Kashmir) as essential for stability on the subcontinent. Recent developments show clear strides made on the part of both parties, individually and bilaterally, to instill needed trust and safeguards that in the Cold War context proved so valuable to nuclear non-use.

Optimism

Trust-Building

One of the most difficult problems of the international system is the ability of states to the intentions of other states. Have India and Pakistan taken steps to increase their discussions both non-nuclear and nuclear issues to avoid maculation?

On the non-nuclear front, there have been impressive non-governmental interactions between India and Pakistan. As Manju Parikh points to groups like the India-Pakistan Friendship Society, Neemrana Initiative and the India-Pakistan Initiative For Peace as policy oriented groups that seek elite interaction between the countries. India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy and The People's Asia Forum bring face-to-face dialogues, not to mention sporting events between the two countries. Such groups permit dialogue among the two nations both on a personal and policy level, leading to greater understanding and perhaps permitting both sides not to misread the intentions of the other—a common problem during the early phases of the Cold War.

CTR

Both nations have also held meetings on the exact issue at hand: the use and deployment of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. As reported by Reuters last week, India and Pakistan expect to finalize a nuclear safety pact in July.[4] The talks have formalized the ‘hotline’ between military directors for each country and both sides have pledges to improve ‘hotline’ communications between the foreign secretaries of each nation.

While details of the future deal are few, the near completion after two years of work shows a commitment on both the sides of India and Pakistan to reach accommodation. And within this time, both nations have maintained a clear sign of restrain and threat reduction: the abstention of nuclear testing on the subcontinent since 1998.

Pessimism

Now the easy charge open for pessimists to make is to argue both these unofficial relations and nuclear dialogues have not ‘done enough’. But it is clear that considerable amounts of “reassurance”[5] have been developed and maintained since 1998.

And for the purposes of this paper, nuclear pessimism cannot be ‘proven’ by simply arguing that India and Pakistan must do more. To prove the case of pessimism in regards to CTR, one must show that the strategic mind-sets of India and Pakistan, despite current dialogues, are still on a dangerous trajectory.

1) Pakistan still maintains security by keeping their nuclear capabilities opaque. Such a policy shows a profound difference between Cold War deterrence and Subcontinent deterrence: the former was between relatively nuclear and conventional equals, whereas the latter is not. Pakistan is both conventionally and nuclearly weaker than India, especially looking into the future. As such, it will remain in Pakistan’s interest to hide its capabilities—keeping the risk of nuclear miscalculation and motivational confusion alive and well on the subcontinent.

2) India’s nuclear posture is entering a transitional period. As Rajesh M. Basrur points out some Indian leaders hold the following benchmarks for Indian ‘minimal deterrence’: a) greater ability to counter China, b) need for nuclear triad, and c) greater command and control.[6] The final goal is one that would no doubt ease nuclear tensions on the continent. But the first two, would be provocative moves to Pakistan.

Both these conditions show that recent bilateral improvements loose sight of complicating multilateral nuclear dimensions. First, there rests the recent Indian-US deal that (if passed without added restrictions) would grant India greater ability to produce nuclear weapons without any corresponding restrictions. Secondly, the deal represents the coming of India as a ‘great power’, and as such leads one to conclude that India will make its nuclear arsenal equal to that of China: seeing that it was China’s entry into the NPT that kept India from joining the NPT in the first place. And within this is the ongoing review of the American nuclear posture: with both the development of tactical nuclear weapons, the redesign of nuclear warheads, and continued development of SDI—which grants both greater first strike capabilities and defense from nuclear reprisals.

All the aforementioned activities suggest, at the least, India will continue to develop and strengthen its nuclear arsenal, if not starting deploying it. Such an action would not be the result of Pakistan, but rather a response to China. But regardless of the motivation, such a development would lead to a clear Pakistani result: greater nuclear secrecy and paranoia of a successful Indian first-strike on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The world system is no longer bi-polar, and the multipolar dynamics of the nuclear dilemma on the subcontinent suggest that one not only look at bilateral CTR measures, but the interlinking nuclear dynamics of the United States, China, India and Pakistan. And when one looks at this marco-view, optimism seems anything but sure.

Kargil Crisis: Proof of Optimism

Misplaced Optimism

Perhaps the strongest case for deterrence optimism comes from experience: not only did the Cold War not see a nuclear strike during its transitional phase, India and Pakistan did not resort to nuclear conflict in the Kargil Crisis of 1999.

Even with a festering Kashmir, jihadi elements in Pakistan, clear Pakistani incursion, both parties avoided using nuclear weapons. Peter Lavoy points to the Kargil crisis ability to show Pakistan that nuclear blackmail would not work, and has resulted in Musharraf’s current playing down of nuclear weapons as political tools.

Yet, one must remember the most important aspect of the Kargil Crisis: the resultant overthrow of Pakistan's democratic government and return to military rule. This event highlights the tumultuous political scene in Pakistan. As such one finds a common thread between the works of Haqqani, Lavoy and Chari stands as the instability of the Pakistani regime. Haqqani goes as far to call Pakistan a “rentier state”. Chari makes the implicit assumption that Pakistan may continue to play for gains, as it did in Kargil—perhaps owing to strong deference to military commands or on the grounds of maintaining national unity. And Lavoy still documents the contradictory positions exiled Pakistani secular leaders on the nuclear issue. Such fear of Pakistani-regime stability is not just to talk of outside analysts: a CIA and NIC (National Intelligence Council) report predicted a Yugoslavian fate for Pakistan by the year 2015.[7]

What good is the ‘proof’ of Kargil if 1) the seeds for crisis remain and 2) any crisis may bring about a vastly different regime in Pakistan?

Conclusion

Whether or not Pakistan will continue exploit the ‘stability-instability paradigm’ and India’s responses to this are secondary to whether Pakistan would pursue such a course of action.

The paper should that the recent developments in Kashmir show an averred commitment to a territorial status-quo by both powers. But this commitment, while definitely alleviating the risk of nuclear brinksmanship, has not resulted in a clear resolution of the crisis. While there has been melioration, there has not been a fundamental transformation of the Indian and Pakistani approaches to Kashmir.

This would not be critically important if it wasn’t for the unequal military positioning of India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan conflicts not only reside in Kashmir, but in their own sense of security. While this paper does not claim that India would desire to nuclear decapitate Pakistan, its nuclear responses to China may be enough to have Pakistan feel this threat. Recent melioration through a coming nuclear safety pact confuses a bi-polar nuclear issue with a multi-polar one: one that misses the recent changes in the US-Indian relationship and the dynamics of Sino-Indian relations. As such, recent improvements will likely not bring transformative elements: having IAEA inspections of nuclear arsenals, sharing nuclear information, or arms-control measures.

And coupled into this discussion is the weak integrity of the Pakistani state—the most critical aspect of this paper’s argument. The existence of exiled secular leaders, a military regime installed after a coup, and jihidist elements show the weak nature of Pakistani civil society. Viewing the Kargil crisis as an important step in the overthrow of democratic governance in Pakistan makes any argument for deterrence optimism ring hallow. From its weak internal coherrence, Pakistan is prone to irrational decisions in regards to the ‘stability-instability paradox’, which may lead to irrational reactions from India. As such, it seems any true stability can only come with Pakistani regime transformation: to one that controls its boarders, enjoys robust popular support, and conducts transparent foreign and domestic policy. While the Cold War eventually saw the overthrow of the Soviet regime, its internal coherence throughout the US-USSR ‘transitional nuclear’ moment was much stronger. Until this can be said of Pakistan, deterrence optimists will not be able to link these two cases together or use the Kargil crisis as a ‘proof’ of optimism.



[1]Kashmir ready with its own film after 39 years.” Associated Press Saturday, May 06, 2006

[2] http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/2320.cfm

[3] http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20060505-012112-5975r

[4] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/26/AR2006042600674.html

[5] Reassurance here has been defined as “the abandonment of dangerous policies with respect to Kashmir, the pursuit of reconciliation, and the negotiation, along with proper implementation, of nuclear risk-reduction measures.” Krepon, Michael. Limited War, Escalation Control, and the Nuclear Option in South Asia.

[6] .Basrur, 59-61

[7] http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20050213-055110-5116r.htm


Works Cited

Kashmir ready with its own film after 39 years. Associated Press Saturday, May 06, 2006.

“President of Pakistan Reaffirms Commitment to Fight Terrorism,” Remarks by the President and President Musharraf of Pakistan in Press Availability Waldorf Astoria
New York, New York. November 11, 2001.

“Report paints gloomy future for Pakistan,” Washington Times- United Press International. February 14, 2005.

Jeena, Kushal. Analysis: India tackles Kashmir dispute.” World Press Herald. Published May 5, 2006.

Parikh, Manju. “India-Pakistan Rapprochement: A Cautious Optimism?” April 18, 2006.

Pakistan, India expect nuclear safety pact in July.” Reuters. Wednesday, April 26, 2006.

Works Cited

Rajesh M. Basrur, “India’s Escalation Resistant Nuclear Posture,” in Krepon, et. al, Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia pp. 56-75;

Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” in Dossani and Rowen, Prospects for Peace in South Asia, pp. 280-301

Michael Krepon, “Limited War, Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia,” in Krepon et. al., Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, pp. 148-167.

Michael Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” in Dossani and Rowen, Prospects for Peace in South Asia, pp. 261-280; P.R.

Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia.” The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (2001).

Gagne, Chris. “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Building on Common Ground,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (2001).

Haqqani, Huisan. Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005

Friday, June 23, 2006

We the People...say what???: Anti-Federalists and the "American" Identity

One has often heard political leaders of all stripes evoke the qualities of our national government: liberty, representation, and federalism. All these ingredients baked together, leave us constitutional republicanism: the more descriptive, long-hand for American democracy. While we may see the various chefs of each political party try to sweeten the cream (at best), or burn our rich tradition (at worst), these tenets have remained shared and fixed within the culinary delight of our nation's government.
But what of a time when the rules of the game, the basic branches of our government didn't exist? Or better yet, what of the time in our history when our current practices, now enshrined within the slowly tattering but eternally majestic paper of our Constitution, came to be?
This article focuses on the conflict between those proponents of the Constitution and those American patriots that fought, futilely, against its ratification. It then asks, what was this different form of republicanism that these failed founding fathers fought so nobly for?

Moving Back: The Legacy of the American Revolution
Paine's World Project
Temporizing a national army, throwing a dash of national fervor, and of course, receiving some aid from France, American patriots blasted colonial rule out of thirteen colonies. But what were they fighting for? Independence, naturally. But what sort of independence?
Some may say that the American Revolution was a natural occurrence: what way could a distant, foreign nation control a new, thriving wilderness? But history follows interests: with British policy getting more brazen, more colonial leaders (once enamored Anglophiles) moved into an independence camp riddled with commoners, idealogues, and, worst yet, radicals.
The desire of merchants for freedom from taxation did not exactly match with the dream of some for a radically free and different type of nation. One based on personal liberty, not state authority.
So, aside from material interests, what was this radical image of the new America?
Thomas Paine, author of Common Sense, clearly articulated America's Revolutionary ideology. One must bear in mind that it was in large part his pamphlet and the debates it aroused that brought a shift in colonial policy: from tortured ambivalence to a clear resolve for independence.
But what did Paine actually call for? His book can be easily summed up: 1) bash the divine mandate (kings and anything like them), 2) prove that America is now ready for independence, and 3) state the bright future that awaits this newly independent American nation on the world stage.
The first part seems easy in retrospect, but at that time went against centuries of the history of mankind. There was no hegemonic republic within the world of the 1770s; all the 'great' nations of the world were either partial or complete monarchies. Rule for centuries (at least within the 'great' European nations) based itself on 'divine right': kings were divinely chosen vessels for authority, and protected the interests of the masses. Furthermore, the then-archetype of the modern world was Britain: a mixed government that fused the tradition of royalty with the common voice of parliament. How could one go against the nation that touched each and every pond of the globe and held the mightiest army in the world? Might must equal right.
Paine's blasphemous manifesto considered kings a perversion of Christianity and discussed their inherent legitimacy gap: how does one retain any greatness of a particular ruler by automatically giving his heirs control, whether or not that son had the ability to walk in a straight line let alone run a state. While such thoughts were in no way new, Paine's pamphlet gave brought them to life within the public sphere to an extent never before witnessed in America.
The second point was a bit harder: Paine provides a few fantastical facts and figures that 'prove' the success of revolution. But empirical arguments were not what mattered to Paine; rather, he appealed to the heart to get the mind into gear. And this ties directly to his final argument: the providential path of Republicanism.
Paine considered America the birth place of a new, modern world. This world would not be dominated by lords, armed with slender swords, muskets and hereditary coats of arms. Instead 'the people' would be sovereign: with all individuals given the right to have a voice in the affairs of state. Such a system was the only way to survive in the new, 'modern' era of world history. America would prove not only that democratic practices could work, but that they were the future. Paine felt that all those who stood in the way would one day fall. Kings could no longer be the law. Law, constructed by free men seeking justice, would become the one and only true royalty of the New World.

Paine's Revolutionary Sketch of America
So how was America supposed to espouse these values? Paine's had a pretty clear 'suggestion' of a constitutional framework:

National Assembly
-annually elected; scope only domestic
-weak executive that presides meetings
-states to be divided into districts; district will elect representatives for their state, with a state minimum of 30 representatives
- President selected by lot, with an alternating system that guarantees a representative from each state being selected from the representatives
-all resolutions must have a 3/5 majority

Constitutional Charter
-made by representatives from the state governments and some national representatives
-sets number and manner of national representatives
-secures national freedoms (religion, property, etc.)
-committee that forms it is immediately dissolved upon completion

State Governments
-everything else

How did we get from this ideal-type republic to our current Constitution?

The "Triumph" of the Traditional Republic: The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union

So maybe the Articles of Confederation and Perceptual Union did not live up to their name-sake, but its importance is clear: this document stands as America's first national plan of government. Exactly what type of national government did America have during those years after the Revolution but before the Constitution came to be?
The Articles of Confederation show a clear attempt to create a 'traditional republic'. What does 'traditional' mean? First that it be small. Few at the time thought that a single, national republic would function over a large area like America. These two selections from Brutus, the pseudonym for a New York Anti-Federalist represent this position well:

...that a free government cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these encreasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States. Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two...
History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent of the Untied States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their government were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.

As evinced by these passages and Paine's constitutional sketch, a republic depended on small constituencies. If the people were truly to be sovereign, each individual must be close to his or her representative.
The Articles of Confederation thus formalized thirteen separate republican states, serving only to provide a national forum to settle interstate dispute. The powers of the national government, as one would expect, were severely limited. With no power to tax or pass any national policy without a unanimous vote, there were many practical problems with this union. Yet, it did deliver on an ideal: within the new American nation, the government closest to the people would have the most control. Relinquishing this state authority to a national government was, to many, tantamount to handing power to a king. Why? Many American leaders felt that revolutionary movements were capricious, and that to maintain such a radical republican government individual citizens must constantly and actively rule-- not be drowned out within a large population. Therefore, any arrangements that could open a door for reactionary forces must be slammed shut. The result is a weak federal state.

The Federalist Response: Philadelphia's Surprise Legacy
So on February 21st, 1787 the Philadelphia Convention commenced, under orders to revise the Articles of Confederation. Behind the secrecy of locked doors, the Convention brought to the nation an entirely new system of government-- a rather liberal reading of its instructions as laid down by the Continental Congress.
The end result is well known: three branches of government, seamless and interlocking checks on authority, an executive branch with separate terms from the legislative branch, and a independent judiciary system.
At its genesis, this document was simultaneously radical and reactionary. For those that saw this as a new path to republicanism, it offered a never-before-articulated formula for successful popular sovereignty. For those that saw its slant toward centralization, it represented the worst possible result: the return of oppression, camouflaged in the language of false democracy, onto a nation that held the divine duty to begin a new chapter in world history.
Behind this major shift from the Articles to the Constitution was the idea that Republics could only perform successfully under larger territories than smaller. This logic went against an entire history of tiny republics: whether it be the ancient city-states of Greece, the quasi-states of Italy, or the strange national experience of Switzerland.
James Madison provided the best-crafted defense in his oft-studied Federalist #10. In Madison's world view, truth was not a convergence of interests but instead a separate substance: one that could be defined through reason. For politicians to arrive at 'just' laws, politicians must be as isolated as possible from particular or abstract interests of the time. He demanded that this republic not make a new class of slaves by replacing a royal tyranny with that of a particularist majority. In his view, to be free from the intoxicating voice of particular interests was the only path towards survival for the Republic.
This republican isolation was achieved by fracturing the voice of the people: through distanced election cycles, unelected branches, and split authorities.
It was thought that 'just' laws could be made only by politicians who had achieved freedom from particular interests. And the easiest way to do this was to expand the number of interests pushing upon each representative. Thus we arrive at our nation's strange republican formula: diluting representation to preserving it.

The Battle of Republics: Federalist vs. Anti-Federalist
As with all political struggles, there was lofty and incendiary rhetoric. And for the Anti-Federalists, they made clear to use it:

O great God, avert that dreadful catastrophe. Let not the day be permitted to dawn, which shall discover to the world that America remains no longer a free nation! O let not this last sacred asylum of persecuted liberty cease to afford a resting place for that fair goddess! Shine in upon us, and illumine all our counsels! Suffer thy bright ministers of grace to come down and direct us; and hovering for awhile on the wings of affection, breathe into our souls true sentiments of wisdom, that in this awful, this important one we may be conducted safely through the maze of error, that a firm basis of national happiness may be established, and flourish in undiminished glory through all succeeding ages!

Anti-Federalists attacked from many angles. Some evoked the language of political theory to disprove the republican formula Madison championed. Some spoke to class interests, stroking the fears of lower middle class voters that they would be locked out of the 'elite' club of national government. Others blasted the Constitution as a repudiation of the Revolution. Evoking the spirit of Paine, one prominent Anti-Federalist speaks of Switzerland:

Let us now contrast this scene with one, where the people personally exercise the powers of government. The three small democratic Cantons of Uri, Schuitz, and Underwald, broke the chains of their former servitude and laid the foundation of the Swiss confederacy, they effected the revolution, and in conjunction with the other democratic Cantons and their democratic allies the Grisons, have supported the grand fabric of Helvetic liberty to this day. Every Swiss farmer is by birth a legislator, and he becomes a voluntary soldier to defend his power and his property; their fathers have been so before them for near 500 years, without revolution, and almost without commotion. They have been the secure spectators of the constant and universal destruction of the human species, which the usurpations of the few have ever created, and must I fear forever perpetuate:-- Whilst all Europe were butchering each other for the love of God, and defending the usurpations of the clergy, under the masque of religion, the malignant evil crept into this sacred asylum of liberty; (but where the government resides in the body of the people, they can never be corrupted by the artifice of the wealth of the few) they soon banished the daemon of discord, and Protestant and Papist sate down under the peaceful shade of the same tree, whilst in ever surround State and kingdom, the son was dragging the father, and brothers, their brothers, to the scaffold, under the sanction of those distinctions: Thus these happy Helvetians have in peace and security beheld all the rest of Europe become a common slaughterhouse...
A free Swiss pays no taxes, on the contrary he receives taxes; every male of 16 years, shares near ten shillings sterling annually, which the rich and powerful surrounding monarchies pay for the friendship of these manly farmers. Whenever their society becomes too large, as government belongs to the citizens and the citizens are the property of no government, they divide amicably, and each separate part pursues the simple form, recommended by their ancestors and become venerable, by the glorious and happy experience of ages of prosperity...

This passage paints the extreme vision of the Anti-Federalist camp. The state of a true republic was meant to be small and powerless. Individual republics were meant to fully empower individuals, while protecting them as well by allowing them to create wealth. Armies were not maintained; in fact, in a world of 'true' republics war would cease to exist.
Note that this Anti-Federalist is not defending the Articles of Confederation: in fact, he calls for a new constitutional and world order that stands as far apart from both the 'norms' represented by the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. He desires small states, states that could be constantly divided, and re-divided depending on the will of the people. There is no talk here of the inherent and legitimate power of the state governments within the Union, which many Anti-Federalists based their arguments against the Constitution upon (and latter succession). Instead, the Constitution must be banished because it takes away forever the hope that idyllic republics, without war and without poor, may shine upon the Earth and teach man by example how consummate harmony can be brought into this world.
Opposing this view were the voices of the more traditional nation-state supporters. Federalists, while creating a new science of politics, were building off the growing tradition of the nation-state. The state had to be large, armed with authorities that could tax the people and raise an army for defense or conquest. People were to look up to their government, not to be a constant participant in it.
Paine's world-view was dying out. The Revolution unleashed a powerfully ideological age, but the realities of the time and time itself were conspiring against the radically new world he so passionately used to throw off his nation's British shackles.
America did not form a series of interlocking republics, maintaining the individualistic ideal. Instead it became, over a long period of time, a fused nation, thanks to a Constitution that gave us clear national leaders who could evoke the national identity to move the masses. America transformed into a more practical hegemon, fighting for freedom in a more traditional fashion: with force and ideology, not just the latter. Have these righteous forces achieved 'good' in the world? Most assuredly. Have they created harm? Naturally. But both these questions point to a more profound query: how truly revolutionary was the end result of the American independence?

The Anti-Federalist Legacy
This article has argued that the Republicanism of America was not a given, but rather a concept that evoked as much passion and debate as the very War of Independence that gave the concept birth.
Furthermore, this article suggests an alternative conception of America: as nation of radical republics, free from any national scope. Had the Antifederalists won, its clear that state governments would have survived and Republican utopia would not exist: but perhaps we would be analogous to today's Europe: smaller states, freeing trading and at peace. But behind the two realities of the Anti-Federalist and Federalist fight were extremes, extremes that have served to define our national character.
The Federalist extreme was Britain: a great centralized state, with armies and power that could shake the world with her might. On the opposite end stood the radical Anti-Federalists who demanded a state truly derived from the people, one without the pains of warfare, class conflict, and religious strife that seemed so inherent to the nation-states of Europe. Both these images were ideals: none really explaining what America would become, but both ideals are what we start from when discussing our national identity.
It's intriguing to imagine an Anti-Federalist America: a Continent of Switzerlands. Small, peace-loving republics bounded by the shared pursuit for individual self-expression. Imagine our country without a standing army and truly direct representation. But one must also imagine a country without a national authority to force states to fall into line, whether over the mundane matter of highway construction or over the profound issue of slavery.
That this new world never came to be permits one to romanticize it, forgetting all the imperfections that might have blighted it beyond repair. But the passions of this new world have stirred within our nation. From the first moment the Constitution breathed life, the Anti-Federalists grabbed and tamed it, stapling onto it a Bill of Rights. So ingrained are these rights that it's hard to believe that they were actually alterations to the Constitution: altercations that many opposed.
And the Antifederalist voice did not die even after the Bill of Rights: with each step towards the expansion of public sovereignty, (whether it is through direct Senate elections or the quasi-direct selection of the President or the emancipation of the slaves) the tenets of Anti-Federalism have remained strong in the American experience. In seems appropriate to note that Lincoln's immortal worlds that "a house divided cannot stand" were borrowed from Paine's Common Sense; a man who returned to America considered a lunatic radical, eventually dying alone, poor, and forgotten.
Perhaps the radical Anti-Federalist view was one made by and limited to the Divine terrain. But it seems that the divine guidance, which so many Anti-Federalists feared was lost in the mundane words of the Constitution, has managed to descend periodically to our mortal and imperfect shores.
These too often forgotten patriots, however imperfect, demand of us various and virtuous acts. They caution us in both their arguments to always be skeptical of our role within the state, this national asylum of liberty. They force us to fully face-up to our utopian visions we have of our nation and critically assess them, not merely to cheer when they are used as campaign fodder. And finally, they instill within us a sacred moral: that in whatever happy asylum we find ourselves, it is sometimes the vanquished lunatics that hold the key to salvation.

Works Cited
Paine, Thomas. Common Sense. Edited by Isaac Kramnick. New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1976.
Storing, Herbert J. The Anti-Federalist. Selections by Murray Dry. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Polls and 2006 Senate Races: Conneticut, Pennsylvania, Washington and Virginia

The 2006 elections are coming, and the anticipation is palpable among the political columns of major newspapers and the cyberspace clatter of the blogosphere. And all important within elections are polls: those marvelous devices that (when functioning properly) sap individual enthusiasm, but also bring monumental tales of underdog victory—(a la Truman's '48 victory).

But polls are mischeavous devils: telling us the obvious and missing the important. One of the most vexing questions I have come across is the relation between favorable ratings and actual polls on votes—and most importantly the degree to which favorable ratings shore up actual polling numbers.

To try to understand this critical but nebulous relation, let's overview four elections that reflect three ideal-types: incumbent-victory, clear contest, and incumbent-loss. All the numbers I will be using, unless specified otherwise, will be from Rassmussen Reports.

Connecticut: Jo'mentum is alive and well in the Constitution State

Joe Lieberman, Democratic Senator from Connecticut, fits easily within the incumbent-victory column. While ruffling the feathers of his own party (refer to my last post for more), it seems clear that Lieberman will win this contest: whether will a clear majority if under the Democratic banner, or a very strong plurality under as an Independent against his Republican and Democratic opponents, Schlesinger and Lamont respectively.

Lieberman is just living up to his state's motto: "He who transplanted shall sustain."

While his own party might dump him, his personal favorability guarantees him (avoiding Murphy's Law) victory in November. Rassmussen reports:

Lieberman is viewed favorably by 67%, unfavorably by 29%. Lamont is viewed favorably by 41%, unfavorably by 37%. Schlesinger, the former mayor of Derby who officially entered the race in mid-April, is viewed favorably by 31%, unfavorably by 36%. He's still an unknown to 33%.

A near 70% favorability rating seems to help Lieberman: only deviating from current polls on the race when one interests another Democratic into the field. Whether it's 38% or 15%, it seems clear that Lieberman is on his way to victory. And while some may say a Lamont poll-boast could be expected after a primary victory, the extensive press coverage dampens the chances of post-nomination Lamont surge. And Schlesinger: the woods he now resides are deep and dark, with little hope of light shining down.

Flying in the Crosshairs in Pennsylvania: Santorum’s Attempt at Term #3

Rassmussen Reports calls Santorum the 'Most Vulnerable Incumbent', a far cry from the presidential aspirations Santorum enjoyed after winning reelection in 2000. Rassmussen reports:

Senator Santorum is viewed favorably by 42% of likely voters, unfavorably by 47%. About a quarter, 26%, view Santorum Very Unfavorably.
Casey is viewed favorably by 59%, unfavorably by 28%, with 13% undecided.

And the polls on a match-up between Casey and Santorum? Santorum has consistently lost: ranging from single digitals to over twenty points. Here one finds the reverse situation of Leibermen: higher unfavorability is crippling his campaign.

Now many have considered this political veteran able to mount a come-back: he did surprisingly well in 2000. Yet his political exposure, thanks to his strong Iraq war support, his loud calls for abortion restrictions and gay-marriage ban, and his book being construed by some as anti-feminist have turned the tide. While one can get elected with high unfavorable rating, when they are higher than your favorable you know you're in trouble.

And today might have been the final blow for Santorum: at a press conference to day he claimed that WMD had been found in Iraq. For a praise-worthy spin on this action, check this out.

Unfortunately, the story is bogus: so bogus, in fact, that Fox News has called Santorum out. Now where was this reporting before the Iraqi War, I do not know—better late than never, I guess?

It seems no matter how hard Santurom pushes he's still going to be pushed off. Fortunately he hails from the state of the Ruffed Grouse, a close family relative of his new occupation: roast goose.

The Tough Cases: Are Allen-Town Virginia and Cantwellian Washington Changing Course?

Democratic Senator Cantwell is facing a rough re-election bid from Republican McGavick. Rassussmen reports:

Cantwell is viewed favorably by 53% of likely votes, unfavorably by 42%. However, just 25% view Cantwell Very Favorably while 20% view her Very Unfavorably.

McGavick is viewed favorably by 46%, unfavorably by 35%. The Republican is less well known than the incumbent he is challenging and fewer voters have firm opinions of him—just 16% say they have a Very Favorable opinion of McGavick while 12% hold a Very Unfavorable opinion.

What is interesting about this race is Cantwell's slide: watching a 15-point lead evaporate to a 4 point lead. Suddenly the favorable ratings aren't much good for: both her favorables and unfavorables are in line with her opponent: if on different scales. Yet, this translates into a 4 point lead.

Why? Her support for the Iraq War.

Here what becomes the problem is extreme disaffection of the Left: 8% of Democrats would vote for someone else in a Cantwell-McGavick match-up. This seems to be the crucial reason for slide, for Cantwell. This article shows the disaffection in Washington of Cantwell's support for the Iraq War.

Thus one finds that Cantwell still on the road to victory: with most left-leaning voters most likely preferring Cantwell over a Republican. She also has more funds, and ample space to pin McGavik.


George Allen is facing a Republican-turned-Democrat, James Webb. Holding higher favorability and lack of intra-party feuding, he’s consistently failed to significantly break 50% in the polls. Suddenly favorability ratings get us a strange result: with a virtual no name, turn-coat Democrat running against Allen, his lead stands around 5-10 points. How can this be?

Part of it may just be a blip, but I feel there is a significant difference between Allen's perceived image in Virginia and the actual. While some make-up Allen as a political jedi-master, the truth is a bit father off. Yes, he sailed to victory for Governor and then won a US Senate seat. But both these achievements reflected weak opponents: particularly Chuck Robb, a politician that seemed to want to be anything but one.

But more importantly, most national coverage forgets to point out that Allen was the starting point for Republican fiscal policies that pushed Virginia to near ruin—ushering in two Democratic governors in a strongly conservative state. Allen's first victory came before Mark Warner's victory as governor, which gave Virginians four years of efficient and straight-talking governance. This seemed to mean something: as Democrat Tim Kaine won the governship in a clearly ‘red’ state against the Republican Attorney General (supported by Allen and Bush) Kilgore.

Allen's allure comes from the Beltway: in Virginia he is a powerhouse but not as untouchable as imagined. [If you want an interesting story on what united George Allen and George Soros check out this article on 527s out]

Allen fails to achieve over 50% support owing to moderates holding a long-memory and his repeated status as the Republican Great White Hope for the presidency in ‘08. This second aspect is nicely displayed by The American Spectator putting Allen on their Cover with the emboldened words: The Conservative President? Yet does America really want a President who holds firm with Bush foreign policy, fence sits on immigration, and spends his time trying to constitutionally ban same-sex marriages?

Maybe: Allen does have that ‘aw shucks’ look like Bush. But unlike 2000, 2008 will not be to the public a place-holder election: merely picking someone to keep prosperity at home and captain our policies aboard. This election will be about men and women who are capable of solving hard problems at a time when American are looking out at a world feels neither safe nor predictable as it was once felt to be.

But the American Spectator does size-up Webb well: he’s not the dream candidate. But they should remember that while Webb might not be perfect, at least he hasn’t told audiences that the Senate is to slow for him.

Allen will probably win his Senate seat, but in doing so it will show his party that he is not the person to be its standard-bearer in two years time.

So what does this tell us about polls?

Favorability ratings are notorious fickle: descriptive only of poll numbers they have gathered. What this over-view really seems to show is only the elusive distance between perception and reality.