Making Theory and Sense out of "Making Democracy Work": Analyzing Cultural Variables in the Development of the Italian Nation-State

Robert Putnam, author of Making Democracies Work, places political culture as the critical variable for democratic success, studying the Italian decentralization of governmental authority during the 1970s. His finding: cultural differences between North and South Italy, forged during the 12^th century, hold the key for their contrasting levels of latter institutional success. While not eliminating political culture as an important variable in institutional success, this paper challenges Putnam’s causal story and, thereby, his conclusions on the nature of institutions. Putnam’s historical narrative suffers from several gaps: neglecting the differing development pathways of northern and southern Italy, the significance of Italian fascism, and post-WWII party structures. Such considerations will suggest that the divide within Italian civic culture rests not within the Italy of the 12th century, but within latter critical junctures. Instead of a slow moving institutional conception, this paper will show Italian cultural orientations as the result of a dynamic history of political decision-making.

Putnam offers the following hypothesis: the existence of putative republics within twelfth century northern Italy stand out as the key to understanding modern Italy (Putnam 136). Putnam bases this claim on a straightforward assumption of human behavior: when power is vertically orientated, a power holder has no need to seek cooperation. But if one deals among political equals, as in a republic, dominance is not possible: cooperation based on trust thus takes its place. Northern Italy’s republican legacy altered the types of autocratic rule it faced during the seventeenth century: all of Italy stood dominated, but the North retained a somewhat civically-minded autocratic structure, with moneys going to hospitals, roads, and local bureaucratic salaries (134). The absence of putative republics in the South, however, fostered a predatory state, with rulers keeping subjects divided and weak (135). Thus while the North found itself entering the era of mass mobilization by incorporating the wealthy and poor into strong communities, fostering trust, the South was left to the Mafia form of “privatized Leviathan (146-47).” These discordant trajectories have resulted in the differing effects of Italian decentralization in the 1970s: low civic-minded regions having less efficient governments, and higher civic minded regions faring better. Hence, it is a lasting difference within civic culture—not socio-economic status—that has determined the trajectory of regional governments in the late twentieth century.

Putnam, though, never explains the root of his causal chain: what permitted northern Italy to develop republics in the first place (180)? Civic culture is thus a norm without a discernable basis. This absence leaves open the charge that Putnam’s theory merely cherry-picks Italian history for conditions that resemble its present condition. Furthermore, what differentiates the 12^th century Italian historical moment from other historical episodes in Italian history? Putnam does not offer a clear benchmark from which to identify critical normative moments. As such, his normative theory holds little generalizablity. Pushing aside this presentist charge and lack of theoretical generalizability, Putnam’s historical narrative holds another substantial weakness: its inability to deal with certain key episodes within Italian history.

Putnam fails to fully consider the unique party structure that came to rule post-WWII Italy: the hegemonic Christian Democratic Party (DC). The DC controlled Italian politics in varying degrees from post-WWII until the end of the Cold War. This uninterrupted one-party rule garners a mere footnote within Putnam’s text (233). Why is this omission significant? DC hegemonic politicking fostered the mafia within southern Italy. The success of this strategy gave the DC power, but at a cost: the tolerance of corruption within southern Italy that undercut any attempt at true regional equality. Thus a political decision, made within a social framework distinct to Italy, led to the fostering of a clientalistic within south regions. American gangs within Chicago were eventually broken by strong national mobilization that blasted through local corruption; in the Italian case, the national government, itself, stood indebted to extra-legal organizations. The DC also found their rule aided by outside actors, receiving significant American support in order to beat back the Red Menace. And before the rise of the DC, there stands the ‘ultra-civical’ development of Italian fascism. If the North embodies a strong culture of trust and civic virtue, how did Italy become fascism’s vanguard?

Aside from these omissions, Putnam blurs the economic differences between northern and southern regions of Italy. He tells of Italy that [s]ome places are better governed than others, even when the governments involved have identical structures and equivalent legal and financial resources (82).” This statement makes clear a theoretical burden Putnam must overcome: showing that economic development is not, itself, the critical variable in the different regional trajectories of Italy. While Italy works to equalize economic relations between its differing provinces, one cannot claim that southern Italy and northern Italy are anywhere near an “equivalent” plane of socio-economic development. Italy boasts the world’s 5^th largest economy. But slicing out the northern region, Italy would stand as the principal pauper of the European Union. Furthermore, attempts to manufacture this ‘equivalence’ have been mired in inefficiency and made dull owing to the nationally (not regional) implemented plans: while Italy and the EU financed a combined aid package of $50 billion dollars to Southern Italy, most of it was misallocated to areas already developed within southern Italy (Nadeau). Political realities foster norms, not the other way around. Decades of corrupt rule inherited from various institutional legacies have served to divide Italy: making the South victim to continuous rent-seeking behavior. And this behavior has been codified within the institutional environment by the state apparatus. Southerners are less civic because the state treats them as prey, emerging as a predator to the body-politic, not its protector.

Rent-seeking does not occur because of a lack of civic-mindedness, but rather owing to the dilemma of collective action. Whereas one could point to a long history of different cultural orientations, one could view the Italian divide as a distinctly 20^th century phenomenon: the active development of the Mafia by the national government after WWII. But how did Italy inherit this regional characteristic? Perhaps the key lies within Napoleon’s land-reform measures of the northern Italian states, which provided room for the future development of an Italian middle class (Rempel). This class structure thus promoted vertical lines of association. But the South remained agrarian, dominated by horizontally orientated landlord-farmer relationships.

But even this view would blind one to the choices and strategies that hold as much, if not more, explanatory power for describing the different natures of Italy’s regional governments. Thelen’s conception of evolutionary institutions could be used to explain the development of the mafia. The mafia modified itself into a vote-machine; getting votes for the DC and receiving, in return, government positions and protection for delivering votes to a consistently dominant party. Thus political decisions, shaped by past legacies, created and reinforced a norm.

While one can exploit weaknesses within Putnam’s work, his focus of theoretical inquiry should not be disregarded. Culture is a dominant force in how all people live, with clear implications on political choices; but it cannot be as static as Putnam suggests. While culture can explain particular forms of institutions or their rules, one must keep in mind that culture is passed down in generational increments (Barnes 119). Times of great historical change (war, economic depression, and economic shifts) bring with them generational normative shifts, as current cultural norms prove useless in different historical contexts. And while culture may color institutional choices, cultural norms have varying strength over time: demanding a study that shows the variable effect norms have had within political outcomes.

Cultural concerns may be powerful, but Putnam’s study of Italian civic culture proves neither its separateness from other factors or its causal primacy. The roots of Putnam’s civic culture norm seem to lie within economic power relations, mirroring interest structures. Thus a state may forge political institutions (or permit other actors to do so), using its monopoly of force, which then can change the interests of state-actors; and thereby altering national norms. Alternatively, the state can choose (or be forced) to operate within the norms it has inherited. While there may be an overall cultural context that the state operates within, Putnam fails to explain the origin of normative variable and fails to offer a benchmark by which to differentiate when states change norms or reinforce them. Thus Putnam’s causal mechanism falls short: unable to explain Italian history or prove its primacy over other explanations. Making Democracy Work convincingly details the existence of a contrasting Italian civic culture, but offers little insight to its role within the black box of state development.

Works Cited

<>Barnes, Samuel H. “Electoral Behavior and Comparative Politics.” Comparative Politics:
Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

<>Nadeau, Barbie. “Poor, Poorer, Poorest.” Newsweek International. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9378520/site/newsweek/ Date Last Accessed: October 30, 2005.

Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
<>Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Rempel, Gerhard. “The Napoleonic Revolution.” Lecture Notes: http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/wc2/lectures/napoleon.html . West New England College. Date Last Accessed: October 31, 2005.